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Abstract. This article explores the role of the EU as a global actor in international relations and 
a promoter of its own standards and values abroad. In particular, this article studies selected 
substantive and procedural means of exporting the acquis communautaire into the legal systems 
of third countries. It is argued that the substantive means refer to the fundamental ways of 
implementing the acquis into third country legal orders. The procedural means relate to specific 
technical/procedural tools which either directly or indirectly encourage the implementation 
of the acquis into third country legal orders. The article concludes that these substantive and 
procedural means are not uniformly applicable, but are rather exercised in accordance with the 
specific objectives of EU external agreements. Analysis of the selected EU external agreements 
illustrates that their objectives unquestionably constitute a driving force behind understanding 
the role and mechanism of the substantive and procedural means of exporting the acquis 
communautaire.
I Introduction
The process of exporting the acquis communautaire1 into legal orders of third 
countries is an indispensable part of the challenging role of the EU as a global 
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 1 In accordance with the EU’s Glossary of Definitions, ‘The Community acquis’ is the body 
of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European 
Union. It is constantly evolving and comprises not only EU primary, secondary binding and 
non-binding legislation but also the ECJ’s case law. EU Glossary <europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/
community_acquis_en.htm>, accessed 18 December 2007. For recent publications on the topic 
see C. Gialdino, ‘Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire’ (1995) 32 CML Rev., pp. 
1089–1121; C. Delcourt, ‘The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept Had Its Day?’ (2001) 
38 CML Rev., pp. 829–870; S. Weatherill, ‘Safequarding the Acquis Communautaire’ in T. 
Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, London and Boston, 1998), pp. 153–178, 161–162; L. Auzolai, ‘The 
Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations’ (2005) 11/2 ELJ, pp. 196–
231; H.G. Krenzler and M. Everson, ‘Preparing for the Acquis Communautaire: Report of the 
Working Group on the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union’, RSC Policy Paper, No. 
98/6, European University Institute, <www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/98_06p.htm>, accessed 
18 December 2007; K. Mortelmans, ‘Community Law: More than a Functional Area of Law, 
Less than a Legal System’ (1996) 1 LIEI, pp. 23–48; R. Petrov, ‘The Dynamic Nature of the 
Acquis Communautaire in EU External Relations’ (2006) 18/2 European Review of Public Law, 
actor.2 Indeed, the adoption of the acquis encourages third countries to revisit 
the compatibility of their national rules and standards to those of the EU, in 
order to share ‘the Union’s common values’.3 Furthermore, the export of the 
acquis contributes to the establishment of a friendly legal environment between 
the EU and third countries, therefore encouraging the flow of investment and 
the mutual liberalization of markets.
Deeper insight into the legal and procedural instruments of this phenomenon 
could clarify many problems, which are relevant for various fields of 
European integration. The simple question ‘how does the EU export its acquis 
communautaire?’ could help us in understanding the logic behind many tools 
of the EU external policy towards third countries, in particular, the impact of 
objectives of EU external agreements on the process of exporting the acquis. 
For this purpose, this article will focus on a few selected substantive and 
procedural means by which the EU exports the acquis into the legal systems 
of third countries. The phrase ‘substantive means’ refers to the fundamental 
ways in which the acquis is implemented into third country legal orders. 
‘Procedural means’ relates to specific technical/procedural tools which either 
directly or indirectly encourage the implementation of the acquis. We shall 
equip our examination by the following procedural means: formal/informal 
involvement in the EU legislation procedure, the exchange of information, 
and technical and financial assistance on behalf of the EU.
In general, the purpose of this article is not to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the substantive and procedural means of exporting the acquis 
communautaire into third country legal systems. This subject matter is vast 
and constantly evolving, reflecting the dynamic nature of EU external policy. 
Therefore, we endeavour to highlight only fundamental features of this 
complicated but highly interesting process by illustrating the most frequently 
applied means of exporting the acquis deduced from EU external agreements 
and EU external policies.
II Substantive Means of Exporting the Acquis Communautaire into 
Third Country Legal Systems
Below we examine and systemize the major substantive means of exporting 
the acquis communautaire into third country legal systems in EU external 
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agreements. These means serve as the basic tools to ensure the implementation 
of the acquis into third country legal orders. For the purpose of our study we 
propose distinguishing two types of the acquis applicable within EU external 
agreements, namely fixed and dynamic. Consequently, the objectives of 
external agreements and the need to export either a fixed or dynamic acquis 
imply different substantive means of exporting.
1. Export of the Fixed Acquis Communautaire into Third Country Legal 
Systems
The export of the fixed or so-called ‘pre-signature’ acquis into third country 
legal systems means that parties to external agreements agree to fix the scope of 
the acquis communautaire at the point of the formal signature of an agreement. 
However, the scope of the fixed acquis does not exclude its further revision 
in the course of the evolution and enhancement of bilateral relations between 
the EU and the third country. A political decision to set specific objectives in 
external agreements, or to exercise an evolutionary clause (the establishment 
of a customs union or free trade area or close sectoral economic cooperation), 
could force the parties to revise the entire scope of the relevant acquis.
The substantive means of exporting a fixed acquis are not common to all EU 
external agreements. In general, they are inherent to external agreements which 
aim to promote close economic or political relations between the EC and third 
countries, but which do not foresee the eventual integration of the latter into 
the EU. That is to say, the export of the fixed acquis serves to fit the specific 
objectives of EU external agreements (the establishment of a customs union, 
free trade area or mutual recognition regime), but not their dynamic objectives 
(association or full EU membership). As an example, the fixed pre-signature 
acquis is intrinsic to the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement4 and 
the EC–Swiss Sectoral Agreement (SAs),5 which are not aimed at the full EU 
membership of the third country. On the other hand, EU external agreements 
targeted at either full membership or an association with the EU (Stabilization 
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 4 OJ 1994, L 1/3.
 5 The Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation; 2) the Agreement on Specific 
Aspects of Government Procurement; 3) the Agreement on Mutual Recognition in Relation to 
Conformity Assessment; 4) the Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products; 5) the Agreement 
on Air Transport; 6) the Agreement on the Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road; 
7) the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. On October 2004 Switzerland signed 
‘second wave’ agreements with the EC: on free trade in services; on processed agricultural 
products; on the environment; on statistics; on the fight against fraud; on the double taxation 
of retired EU civil servant pensions; on the taxation of savings; on the extension of Schengen 
and the Dublin Conventions’ acquis to Switzerland; on education; and on the media. For the 
latest information on the negotiation process see under <www.europa.admin.ch>, accessed 18 
December 2007.
and Association Agreements (SAAs),6 Europe Agreements (EAs)7) prioritize 
the export of a dynamic acquis into third country legal systems.
In general, the fixed acquis is embedded either in the main text or the 
annexes to the EU external agreements. Both constitute an integral part of 
the third country legal orders, subject to respective national constitutional 
requirements. EU external agreements/annexes specify the scope of the acquis 
communautaire applicable to the third country (object, subject, exemptions) 
and indicate the hierarchy of the relevant acquis, thereby clarifying its binding 
force for a third country legal order. For instance, within the EEA Agreement 
the binding acquis is labelled ‘acts referred to’. The relevant soft acquis 
(Commission communications and recommendations, Council resolutions 
and recommendations) is identified as ‘Acts of which the Contracting Parties 
shall take note’. However, one must always be aware that a reference to a 
specific EC Act in external agreements/annexes does not automatically imply 
the identical application of an EC Act within a third country legal order.8 
As EU external agreements and the EU institutions frequently reiterate, the 
relevant EC Act should be applicable in accordance with the objectives of the 
EU external agreement.9
The primacy of the fixed acquis communautaire within third country legal 
orders derives from their national constitutional arrangements.10 The effective 
implementation and uniform interpretation of the relevant acquis within third 
country legal systems also depends on their national constitutional procedures. 
Furthermore, we believe that progress in bilateral relations with the EU directly 
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 6 At the moment of writing the SAAs have been concluded with FYROM (COM (2001) 90 
final) and Croatia (COM (2001) 371 final). (The FYROM and Croatia SAAs entered into force 
on 3 May 2001 and on 12 December 2001 respectively. The SAA with Albania was signed on 
12 June 2006 and is in the process of ratification.
 7 The EAs concluded with the following Central and East European countries (CEECs): 
Poland (OJ 1993 L 348/2, in force since 1 February 1994); Hungary (OJ 1993 L 347/2, in force 
since 1 February 1994); the Czech Republic (OJ 1994 L 360/2, in force since 1 February 1995); 
the Slovak Republic (OJ 1994 L 359/2, in force since 1 February 1995); Romania (OJ 1994 L 
357/2, in force since 1 February 1995); Bulgaria (OJ 1994 L 358/3, in force since 1 February 
1995); Lithuania (OJ 1998 L 51/3, in force since 1 January 1998); Latvia (OJ 1998 L 26/3, 
in force since 1 January 1998); Estonia (OJ 1998 L 68/3, in force since 1 January 1998); and 
Slovenia (OJ 1999 L 51/3, in force since 1 February 1999). Now, all EAs have expired after the 
accession of the CEECs into the EU.
 8 For example, the Introduction to Annex XIV of the EEA Agreement (OJ 1994, L 1/3) 
warns that ‘preambles, the addresses of the EC Acts, references to territories or languages 
of the EC, references to rights and obligations of EC Member States, their public entities, 
undertakings and individuals in relation to each other; and references to information and 
notification procedures are specific to the EC legal order’ and therefore cannot be identically 
applied to EFTA member states.
 9 See EEA Agreement Protocol 1 ‘On horizontal adaptations’ of the EEA Agreement. Case 
270/80 Polidor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops [1982] ECR 329.
 10  For instance, see Articles 7 and 103 EEA Agreement. See Protocol 35 of the EEA 
Agreement.
influences the third country’s attitude towards the implementation of the 
acquis. In other words, it could be argued that any decision to accomplish the 
effective implementation of the relevant acquis is both political and legal.
2. Exporting the Dynamic Acquis Communautaire into Third Country
Legal Systems
The timely implementation of the fixed pre-signature acquis does not 
automatically imply the coherence of a third country’s legal order with the 
dynamic acquis communautaire following the formal signature of an EU 
external agreement.11 A link between the pre-signature acquis and the dynamic 
acquis could eventually be lost if the former is not regularly amended and 
uniformly applied within third countries’ legal orders. For this reason, EU 
external agreements refer to the substantive means of ensuring the uniform 
application and timely incorporation of the dynamic ‘post-signature’ acquis. 
Analysis of EU external agreements allows us to consider the following means 
of exporting the dynamic acquis communautaire: a) homogeneity; b) binding 
and soft-harmonization commitments; c) approximation clauses; d) a mutual 
recognition regime.
a) Homogeneity. The EEA Agreement is the only EU external agreement to 
employ so-called homogeneity as a means of ensuring the actual adaptation of 
the dynamic post-signature acquis communautaire into the legal orders of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) member states.12 It should be clarified that 
the principle of homogeneity is not exclusive to the adaptation of the dynamic 
acquis. It is applicable in the course of the implementation of both fixed and 
dynamic acquis into EFTA member states’ legal orders. In the context of the 
latter, the principle of homogeneity means that as soon as a new relevant EC 
rule has been formally adopted by the Council or the European Commission, 
the EEA Joint Committee must take a decision concerning the appropriate 
amendment of the EEA Agreement, ‘with a view to permitting a simultaneous 
application’ of legislation in the EC and the EEA countries.13 The principle 
of homogeneity presumes the equality of the parties to this process, since the 
incorporation of the relevant acquis cannot take place at all in the absence of 
an agreement between the EC on the one hand and the EEA countries ‘speaking 
with one voice’ on the other.14 Overall, the application of homogeneity has 
proved to be a well-functioning means of developing the legal systems of the 
EEA countries and the EC in parallel.
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 11 On the nature of the EC dynamic acquis see Petrov, note 1 above.
 12 In the meantime, the EFTA comprises Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
 13 Article 102(1) EEA Agreement.
 14 Article 93(2) EEA Agreement.
The concept of homogeneity is based on two elements: 1) the timely 
implementation of EC legislation into the EEA Agreement, ‘in order to 
guarantee the legal security and homogeneity of the EEA . . . as closely as 
possible to the adoption by the Community of the corresponding Community 
legislation’;15 and 2) the uniform interpretation of the adopted acquis and the 
EFTA rules.
Other EU external agreements do not replicate the EEA homogeneity formula 
in full. This could be explained by the relatively high costs incurred by the 
permanently expanding EU in implementing the homogeneity procedure. The 
EU has not been eager to apply the homogeneity formula in its relations with 
third countries on the eve of the unprecedented institutional and legislature 
reforms envisaged in the EU Constitutional Treaty. Instead, the EU has 
embarked upon a more cautious strategy. It simply employs specific elements 
of the homogeneity which are in line with specific objectives of the relevant EU 
external agreements. In our opinion, EU external agreements, which envisage 
either close economic cooperation (an EC–Turkey customs union), or close 
sectoral cooperation (EC–Swiss SAs), encourage the uniform interpretation 
of the third country’s legal system with the dynamic EC acquis. For example, 
the aim of establishing a customs union with the EC allows Turkey to ensure, 
on a unilateral basis, the timely implementation and uniform interpretation 
of the relevant dynamic EC acquis. Provisions of Decision 1/95 which are 
identical in substance to the corresponding provisions of the EC Treaty should 
be interpreted in conformity with the relevant ECJ case law to ensure the 
proper functioning of the EC–Turkey Customs Union.16 Furthermore, Turkey 
must ensure that the principles of the EC Treaty are upheld, along with the 
principles contained in the secondary legislation and the case law developed 
on this basis.17
On the other hand, the objective of bilateral sectoral cooperation between 
the EC and Switzerland (relating to the EC–Swiss SAs on the free movement 
of persons and air transport) could justify non-binding commitments on 
behalf of Switzerland regarding the uniform interpretation of the dynamic 
post-signature acquis communautaire within the Swiss legal system. For 
example, the EC–Swiss Joint Committee has full discretion to ‘determine the 
implications’ of post-signature ECJ case law on the functioning of the EC–
Swiss SAs.18 In other words, Switzerland is not bound by the dynamic post-
signature acquis communautaire. The relevant acquis adopted after the date 
of signature of this agreement is to be communicated to the EC–Swiss Joint 
Committee for its final political decision.
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 16 Article 66 Decision 1/95 (OJ 1996 L 35/1).
 17 Article 41 Decision 1/95.
 18 Article 16(2) of the EC–Swiss SA on the free movement of persons (OJ 2002, L 114/6), 
Article 1(2) of the EC–Swiss SA on Air Transport (OJ 2002, L 114/73).
To sum up, we emphasize that the principle of homogeneity has not become 
universally applicable in EU external agreements, owing to its complexity 
and the need for relatively close cooperation with third country legal systems. 
Instead, recent EU external policy has tended to apply selected elements of the 
homogeneity mechanism that suit specific objectives of its external agreements 
(access to mutual markets, mutual recognition, sectoral cooperation, etc.).
b) Binding and soft-harmonization commitments. The application of binding 
and soft-harmonization commitments in EU external agreements is one of the 
frequently used means of exporting the dynamic acquis into third country legal 
systems.19 We propose distinguishing between binding and soft-harmonization 
commitments in accordance with the criteria below. First, binding and soft 
harmonization commitments are differentiated by the specific wording of an 
agreement’s provisions. For instance, binding harmonization commitments 
in the SAAs are emphasized by phrases such as ‘shall ensure’, ‘shall take 
measures’, ‘shall take the necessary measures’, ‘undertake to authorise’, and 
‘the SAA Council may decide to oblige’. Soft-harmonization commitments 
are distinguished by non-binding terminology as well as by the wide 
discretion granted to third countries in the course of implementing the acquis 
communautaire. In general, soft-harmonization commitments are contained 
in phrases such as: ‘shall take the necessary measures in order to gradually 
achieve’, ‘shall seek to promote the use of Community regulations’, ‘will 
establish a plan’, ‘will cooperate in order to align the standards of . . . on 
those of the Community’, ‘cooperation . . . shall have as its aim . . . the 
gradual harmonisation’, ‘the Parties may cooperate’, and ‘the cooperation 
shall focus’.
Second, binding harmonization commitments set a deadline for the 
implementation by the third country of the relevant acquis. For example, the 
EC–Swiss SA on technical barriers obliges Switzerland to ‘adopt, no later 
than six month after signature of this Agreement, arrangements that are 
equivalent to Community legislation on the technical conditions governing 
road transport’. The Parties to the EC–FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) SAA and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)20 
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 19 For the comprehensive account of the concept of ‘harmonization’ see L. Mistelis, ‘Is 
Harmonisation a Necessary Evil? The Future of Harmonisation and New Sources of International 
Trade Law’ in M. Cremona, J. Fletcher and L. Mistelis (eds.), Foundations and Perspectives of 
International Trade Law (Sweet and Maxwell, Andover, 2001, ), pp. 3–27.
 20 EC–Russia PCA (OJ 1997 L 327), entered in force 1 December 1997; EC–Ukraine PCA 
(OJ 1998, L 49), entered in force 1 March 1998; EC–Moldova PCA (OJ 1998, L 181), entered 
in force 1 July 1999; EC–Armenia PCA (OJ 1999, L 239), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC–
Azerbaijan PCA (OJ 1999, L. 246), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC–Georgia PCA (OJ 1999, L 
205), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC–Republic of Kazakhstan PCA (OJ 1999, L 196), entered 
in force 1 July 1999; EC–Kyrgyz Republic PCA (OJ 1999, L 196), entered in force 1 July 1999; 
undertake a commitment to accede within five years to the specified list of 
multilateral conventions on intellectual, industrial and commercial property 
rights.21 Turkey is expected to ‘incorporate into its internal legal order the 
Community instruments relating to the removal of technical barriers to trade’ 
within five years from the date of entry into force of Decision 1/95.22
On the other hand, soft-harmonization commitments are worded to avoid 
any explicit deadlines for the implementation of the acquis communautaire. 
Instead, soft-harmonization commitments provide sufficient flexibility for a 
third country to achieve the objectives of the agreement. For instance, Parties 
to the EC–Korea Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) 
‘shall examine’ measures to harmonize health and plant health, as well as 
environmental standards and rules with a view to facilitating trade. This 
should be achieved taking account of the legislation in force for both Parties, 
and in conformity with WTO rules.23 The harmonization process within the 
EU–Mexico TDCA is aimed at the mutual liberalization of trade and the 
establishment of a favourable investment legal environment.24
Third, we argue that harmonization commitments must be read in line with 
the objectives of EU external agreements. This especially relates to situations 
where the objectives of the external agreements evolve in accordance with 
the revision of EU policy towards third countries. For instance, the aim of 
‘gradual integration into the Community’ has from the outset presumed the 
eventual full legislative compatibility Central and East European countries 
(CEECs) with the selected areas of the acquis communautaire which are 
of particular importance for the association, such as consumer protection,25 
standards and conformity assessment,26 and customs law.27 In a short period 
of time, the nature of harmonization commitments within the EAs has been 
revisited alongside the reconsideration of political relations between EU 
and EA members. This has changed following the EU’s political decision 
to offer CEECs candidate country status. Thereafter, the same wording of 
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EC–Uzbekistan PCA (OJ 1999, L 229), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC–Republic of Belarus 
PCA (COM (95)137 final), signed in 1995, but in 1996 EU–Belarus relations were stalled 
following political setbacks; EC–Turkmenistan PCA (COM (97) 693 final).
 21 Articles 71 FYROM and Croatia SAAs. For the list of the conventions see Annex III 
EC–Ukraine PCA.
 22 Article 8(1) Decision 1/95.
 23 Article 21(2) EC–Korea TDCA (OJ 2001 L 090).
 24 Article 15(b), (c) EC–Mexico TDCA (OJ 2000 L 276).
 25 For example, Article 94(1) EC–Estonia EA.
 26 For example, Estonia is obliged to use and implement EC technical regulations and 
standards, as well as conformity assessment procedures within the areas of cooperation. In 
general, the CEECs can adhere to de minimis EC standards, but they are free to develop and 
implement higher standards if necessary in the course of adopting EC standards (Article 75 
EC–Estonia EA).
 27 For example, Article 92 EC–Hungary EA.
the approximation provisions in the EAs has been read in different ways 
according to the enhanced objectives of cooperation, inter alia eventual 
full EU membership. This means that, following the Copenhagen Summit, 
approximation provisions in the EAs have been given a new dimension. In 
particular, the CEECs have committed themselves to the whole ‘accession 
acquis’ to fulfil the requirements of EU membership. One may argue that the 
political reconsideration of EA objectives has not altered the legal nature of 
the harmonization/approximation commitments. Indeed, from the outset, the 
CEECs have accepted the political commitment to adopt the ‘accession acquis’. 
However, after some period of time, the parties have embarked upon specific 
legal commitments in order to meet the requirements for full EU membership. 
The EU has drafted the National Plans for Adoption of Acquis (NPAAs) and 
has carefully monitored their implementation with regard to each Central and 
East European candidate country. This means that the political decision to 
launch membership negotiations depends on the successful implementation of 
the NPAAs by Central and East European candidate countries.
The EU external agreements that target neither full EU membership nor 
common economic structures (customs union, free trade area) between the 
EC and third countries do not impose binding harmonization commitments. 
They are justified by very few binding commitments on behalf of the EU 
towards the third country. Simply speaking, these agreements could offer 
a third country very little in return for pursuing the binding harmonization 
programme. For example, the objectives of the PCAs and TDCAs regarding 
closer economic and political cooperation imply adequate non-binding 
harmonization commitments. These agreements provide that the parties may 
cooperate on issues ranging from the promotion and protection of investments 
and developing conditions on open and competitive public procurement to the 
facilitation of cultural cooperation.
To sum up, harmonization commitments are an efficient way of exporting 
the acquis communautaire into third countries’ legal systems. Of course, this 
is conditional upon the effective application of these commitments by the third 
country. Most of the EU external agreements envisage soft-harmonization 
commitments, thereby encouraging third countries to embark upon the 
voluntary harmonization of their legislation to that of the EU. Achieving the 
objectives of EU external agreements depends on the effective enforcement 
and implementation by third parties of the harmonization commitments. 
Nonetheless, we believe that third countries possess some degree of discretion 
in enforcing soft-harmonization commitments in accordance with their own 
policy priorities and needs. In other words, third countries may pursue the 
enforcement of soft-harmonization commitments in parallel with developing 
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bilateral political relations with the EU (such as the example of the PCA 
countries).28 ‘Conditionality clauses may significantly elevate the effective 
enforcement of non-binding harmonization commitments. In this case, the EC 
may enhance the format of its relations with certain third countries, and may 
subsequently reconsider the binding force of its harmonization commitments. 
These processes have already taken place with regard to the CEECs and some 
Mediterranean countries.
c) Approximation clauses. So-called ‘approximation clauses’ may be considered 
the most frequently applied means of exporting the acquis communautaire 
into the legal systems of third countries. Approximation clauses differ from 
harmonization commitments in several aspects. First, approximation clauses 
represent a distinct binding/non-binding legal provision in EU external 
agreements. Second, approximation clauses have more or less similar structure 
and wording throughout EU external agreements. Third, approximation 
clauses can be found under a separate title in EU external agreements, namely 
under the heading ‘approximation of laws/legislative cooperation’.29 Fourth, 
the general objective of an approximation clause is to encourage a signature 
to an EU external agreement to approximate its legislation to the acquis 
communautaire on a voluntary basis. In other words, contrary to harmonization 
commitments, approximation clauses do not envisage the mutual convergence 
of the parties’ legislation to an EU external agreement. Notably, the EC–Israel 
EuroMediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) envisages the possibility 
of the mutual approximation of laws, thereby equating the Israeli legal system 
to that of the EC, and also envisaging at least the possibility of exporting the 
Israeli legal heritage into the acquis.30 However, this is more an exception 
rather than the rule in EU external relations.
d) Mutual recognition agreements. The conclusion of mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) between the EC and third countries serves as an alternative 
substantive method of exporting the acquis communautaire for third countries 
which would never embark upon the harmonization of their legislation to 
that of the EU. Generally, MRAs are concluded with third countries with 
an advanced level of economic and political development, and which are 
unlikely to join the EU in the foreseeable future (USA, Canada, Australia, 
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 28 R. Petrov, ‘Recent Developments in the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law’ 
(2003) 8/2 EFA Rev., pp. 125–142.
 29 For instance, these are: the EAs Title V ‘Payments, Capital, Competition and other 
economic provisions, Approximation of Laws’; the SAAs Title VI ‘Approximation of Laws 
and Law Enforcement’.
 30 The approximation clause in the EC–Israel EMAA (OJ 2000 L 147/1) reads: ‘The Parties 
shall use their best endeavours to approximate their respective laws in order to facilitate the 
implementation of this Agreement’ (Article 55 EC–Israel EMAA).
Japan, Switzerland, Israel and New Zealand). The mutual recognition regime 
presumes the existence of mutually recognized legal principles and standards 
between the parties. Mutual recognition agreements target the establishment 
of mutually recognized regulatory and conformity assessment systems which 
are underpinned by the increase in confidence between mutual recognition 
agreement partners. To this end, the EC mutual recognition agreements 
encourage third countries to use relevant international conformity assessment 
standards, guides and recommendations, as well as harmonized EC and 
international conformity assessment procedures. In general, the mutual 
recognition regime focuses on specific areas that are important for ensuring 
the liberalization of mutual trade between the EC and third countries. For 
example, these areas are: conformity assessment, standardization, metrology, 
quality control, agricultural products and professional qualifications.
The EU institutions have been clear on the focal importance of the 
MRAs for trade with important trading partners. For instance, the European 
Commission has claimed on many occasions that the adoption of MRAs 
is one of the Community’s strategies for pursuing its trade objectives in 
the areas of standards and conformity assessment.31 As far as the EU and 
third countries are concerned, the utility of MRAs for opening up foreign 
markets is conditional on the full confidence in the other party’s conformity 
assessment processes, i.e. comparable concepts of product testing and 
approval, and comparable or mutually acceptable systems of certification. 
Therefore, only a sufficiently high level of trade between the EU and a third 
country could justify the significant costs of setting up a mutual recognition 
agreement. Historically, the EC has signed a moderate number of MRAs with 
third countries, all of which it considers important trading partners with an 
advanced level of economic and political development. EU foreign policy 
does not consider the conclusion of MRAs a part of its conditionality policy 
towards third countries. In other words, the EU launches mutual recognition 
agreement negotiations only on the proviso that the third country undertakes 
considerable economic, political and legal reforms. For example, some EU 
external agreements provide that at some stage, ‘when the circumstances 
are right’, the parties may conclude agreements for the mutual recognition 
of certifications.32 The EC conditionality goes further in EC–ACP countries 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) legislative cooperation which cites mutual 
recognition agreements in sectors of mutual economic interest in successful 
ACP countries’ liberalization efforts.33
In the end, a mutual recognition regime may be considered one of the 
most sophisticated substantive means of acquis export, since it requires a 
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Policy in the Field of Standards and Conformity Assessment’ COM (1996) 564 final.
 32 For instance, see Article 40 of the EC–Ukraine PCA.
 33 Article 47 of the Cotonou Agreement (OJ 2000 L317/3).
considerable degree of confidence on behalf of the EC in the legal system 
of a third country. However, it does not prevent the EC from associating the 
opening of negotiations on a mutual recognition regime with its conditionality 
policy towards third countries. In general, conditionality clauses in EU external 
agreements are constructed in such a way as to encourage the voluntary 
harmonization of third country legal systems with that of the EC, in return for 
the vague prospect of a mutual recognition regime.
III Procedural Means of Exporting the Acquis Communautaire
Despite their secondary nature, the procedural means of exporting the acquis 
provide a strong case in proving our findings in this article. Similar to what 
has been argued above, we suggest that the procedural means of acquis export 
are not common to all EU external agreements, but rather they mirror specific 
objectives of the EU external agreements.
1. Formal/Informal Involvement of Third Countries in the EC Decision-
making Process
The most advanced and sophisticated procedural mechanism for the 
involvement of third countries in the EC decision-making process is elaborated 
in the EEA Agreement. The far-reaching objectives of the EEA Agreement, 
which ensure access of the EFTA countries to the EC internal market, entail 
the comprehensive adoption by the latter of the relevant acquis. For this 
purpose, the procedure of homogeneity ensures the export of the pre-signature 
acquis and the timely implementation of the post-signature acquis into the 
legal systems of the EFTA countries.
The incorporation of the acquis communautaire within the EEA Agreement 
takes two procedural forms: ‘decision shaping’ and ‘decision taking’.34 These 
procedural forms are exercised within a twin-pillar EEA structure, which 
comprises EC and EFTA institutions. This means that both decision-shaping 
and decision-taking within the EEA are conducted under close cooperation 
between EC and EFTA bodies. At the same time, neither the EFTA institutions 
nor the EEA member states are involved in EC decision-making. In accordance 
with Article 99(1) of the EEA Agreement, decision-shaping provides a forum 
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On: Dynamic Homogeneity in Practice And Its Implementation By The Two EEA Courts’ 
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for early consultations of the Commission with the EFTA countries’ experts. 
The Commission ‘shall informally (emphasis added) seek advice from the 
EFTA experts in the same way as it seeks advice from the EC Member States 
for the elaboration of its proposals’.35 This means that the EFTA member 
states’ experts may access Commission committees for the purpose of taking 
part in drafting the relevant EC legislation.36 Participation in the committees 
ensures the efficient incorporation of new EC legislation. At the present 
moment, representatives of the EFTA member states have access to some 360 
committee working groups, as well as to numerous scientific committees.37 
Then the Commission transmits to these experts a copy of a drafted legislative 
proposal (not necessarily drafted in close cooperation with the experts) in 
the areas covered by the EEA Agreement. Thereafter, a preliminary exchange 
of views on the proposal takes place in the EEA Joint Committee ‘at the 
request of one of the Contracting Parties’.38 However, it is not clear if such an 
exchange of views may be influenced by possible negative feedback made by 
the EFTA experts.
The objective of the ‘decision-taking procedure’ is to ensure the ‘legal 
security and the homogeneity of the EEA’.39 Within this procedure, the EEA Joint 
Committee takes decisions to ensure as closely as possible the simultaneous 
application of the new and old acquis communautaire within the annexes of 
the EEA Agreement.40 For this purpose, the Commission is responsible for 
‘early warnings’ to EFTA countries, via the EEA Joint Committee, whenever 
the EU legislature adopts new legislation on an issue governed by the EEA 
Agreement. Thereafter, the EEA Joint Committee is expected to make every 
effort to ensure the amendment of a relevant EEA Agreement annex.41
None of the EU external agreements replicates the depth of the formal/
informal involvement of third countries into the EC legislative process in the 
EEA Agreement. This is because the homogeneity procedure was a part of 
the political compromise reached exclusively between the EC and the EFTA 
signatories to the EEA Agreement. Instead, the latest EU external agreements 
envisage a degree of third party involvement in the EC decision-making 
process, which is in line with the specific objectives of these agreements, 
and which is also in accordance with bilateral political arrangements between 
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(EEA Joint Committee Annual Report 2002, <secretariat.efta.int/Web/Publications/
AnnualReport/>, accessed 18 December 2007).
 38 Articles 99(2) and 99(3) EEA Agreement.
 39 Article 102(1) EEA Agreement.
 40 Article 102(1) EEA Agreement.
 41 Article 102(3) EEA Agreement. This procedure requires the unanimous agreement of all 
the EFTA countries in order to make a decision.
the EU and third countries. The aim of a customs union between the EC and 
a third country could entail a considerable degree of involvement by that 
third country’s experts in the EC decision-making process. For instance, 
in accordance with Decision 1/95, Turkish experts should be informally 
consulted by the EC at the drafting stage of EC legislation where this falls 
in an area of direct relevance to the operation of the EC–Turkey Customs 
Union. It must be noted that the Commission is not obliged to follow the 
advice of the Turkish experts. The experts may be involved in the work of a 
number of technical committees, which assist the Commission in the exercise 
of its executive powers, in areas of direct relevance to the functioning of the 
Customs Union.42
The EC–Swiss SAs imply the informal binding involvement of Swiss 
experts in the drafting of the dynamic acquis communautaire. Under the 
EEA Agreement, the Commission is obliged to consult the EFTA member 
states’ experts on the early stages of preparation of any new relevant EC law 
whereas, in contrast, the EC–Swiss information exchange procedure means 
that Switzerland must be notified of the acquis once it already has been 
adopted.43 During the preparatory drafting stage of the acquis, Swiss experts 
may be informed and consulted ‘as closely as possible’ before and after the 
meetings of EU experts. It is only ‘at the request of one of the Contracting 
Parties [that] a preliminary exchange of views may take place in the Joint 
Committee’.44
The remaining EU external agreements consider neither the formal nor the 
informal involvement of third countries in EC decision-making processes. 
Recent EU external agreements avoid references to such commitments. 
Instead, EU external agreements offer wider options for the mutual exchange 
of information, and technical/financial assistance, to encourage the export of 
the acquis into the legal orders of third countries (PCAs, SAAs, TDCAs). The 
EU external development agreements contain mere statements of intent for 
mutual legislative cooperation. For example, the Cotonou Agreement calls for 
‘developing functioning links between ACP and European standardization, 
conformity assessment and certification institutions’, and to exchange 
information on their legislation,45 experiences and policies.46
We conclude with two points. First, the EC is reluctant to extend to the latest 
EU external agreements the involvement of third country experts, which we can 
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Persons envisages the exchange of information not only on developments in legal acts but also 
in the ECJ case law.
 44 Article 23 of the EC–Swiss SA on air transport.
 45 Article 50(2) Cotonou Agreement.
 46 Article 51 Cotonou Agreement.
witness in the EC decision-making procedure applied in the EEA Agreement 
and in the decisions taken by the EC–Turkey Association Council. The 
example of the EEA Agreement has probably proved costly and too advanced 
for the specific format of relations between the EU and a third country. This 
might indicate that the EU considers this procedural means suitable only for 
external agreements with a high level of mutual economic integration (customs 
union or access to mutual markets). Even the EU external agreements with the 
objective of eventual EU membership (SAAs, EAs) do not foresee the level 
of formal/informal involvement similar to that cited in economic integration 
agreements (EAA Agreement, EC–Turkey customs union). Second, the degree 
of involvement of third country experts in EU decision-making is linked to 
the nature of the harmonization/approximation commitments, and to the 
entire objectives of the EU external agreements. If these agreements envisage 
binding harmonization/approximation commitments, and if they pursue close 
economic integration (EEA Agreement, EC–Swiss SAs, Ankara Agreement), 
then some degree of formal/informal involvement is possible. On the other 
hand, EU external agreements that impose soft approximation/harmonization 
commitments, and which avoid the prospect of close economic integration 
(PCAs, EMAAs, TDCAs), do not include the possibility of involvement in EU 
decision-making. In this regard, our study shows that the latest EU external 
agreements offer other options (informational assistance, technical and 
financial support) to third countries which have embarked upon the process of 
voluntary harmonization, in order to fulfill soft approximation/harmonization 
commitments. We consider these alternatives in detail below.
2. Exchange of Information
The exchange of information is one of the most frequently applied procedural 
means of exporting the acquis communautaire into the legal systems of third 
countries. EU external agreements envisage various methods of information 
exchange. Similar to what has been argued above, we believe that the 
procedures of information exchange are linked directly to the aims of the EU 
external agreements. To prove our findings we shall consider the substance of 
the procedure of information exchange within selected groups of EU external 
agreements.
In the EEA Agreement, the EC–Turkey Customs Union and the EC–Swiss 
SAs, the exchange of information serves as a fundamental procedural tool, in 
order to achieve the uniform interpretation and timely implementation of the 
acquis communautaire in EU external agreements.
The procedure of information exchange underpins the whole mechanism of 
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the homogeneous interpretation of the EFTA countries’ legislation, as well as 
the post-signature acquis in the EEA Agreement.47 For this purpose, the EEA 
Joint Committee keeps the ECJ and the EFTA Court case law under constant 
review. Furthermore, a court or tribunal from an EFTA country, if it considers 
necessary, may ask the ECJ to rule on the interpretation of an EEA Agreement 
provision identical in substance to the acquis communautaire.48 The ECJ has 
been protective regarding its own monopoly on the interpretation of the acquis, 
and the potential threat from the EEA Court, as envisaged in the first draft 
of the EEA Agreement.49 These problems were subsequently rectified in the 
second version of the EEA Agreement. The twin-pillar structure set up in the 
second version of the EEA Agreement clearly distinguishes the EC from the 
EFTA member states from an institutional point of view, and no longer affects 
either the exercise of power by the EC and its institutions, or the interpretation 
of the acquis communautaire. Thus, the ECJ has acknowledged that within the 
twin-pillar approach the autonomy of the EC legal order is secure.50
In accordance with Article 106 of the EEA Agreement, the system of 
information exchange comprises the following stages: a) transmission to 
the Registrar of the ECJ judgments of the listed courts on the interpretation 
and application of the EEA and the EC founding treaties, as well as the Acts 
concerning provisions identical in substance to those in the EEA; b) the 
Registrar of the ECJ classifies these judgments, including as far as necessary 
the drawing up and publication of translations and abstracts; c) the Registrar 
of the ECJ issues the relevant documents to the competent national authorities, 
which are to be designated by each Contracting Party.
In the EC–Turkey Customs Union the procedure of information exchange 
is equivalent to that of the EU Member States. This means that Turkey must 
submit information to the Commission in all cases where the Member States 
must do so. In return, the Commission is obliged to share its reports and 
assessments with Turkey.51 The Parties are committed to publish all information 
related to the instruments employed.52
The procedure of information exchange within the EC–Swiss SAs does not 
equate to the consultation and information procedure set up within the EEA 
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 47 Recital 15 EEA Agreement and Article 105(1) EEA Agreement encourages the Parties ‘to 
arrive at as uniform an interpretation as possible of the provisions of the Agreement and those 
provisions of Community legislation which are substantially reproduced in the Agreement’.
 48 Article 107 EEA Agreement. See Protocol 34 ‘On the possibility of courts and tribunals 
of EFTA states to request the Court of Justice of European Communities to decide on the 
interpretation of EEA rules corresponding to EC rules’.
 49 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR 6079, at 30–46.
 50 Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR 2821, at 18–35.
 51 The distribution of information on behalf of Turkey to other EC Member States is 
achieved via the Commission. Only in urgent cases is the rapid transfer of information is 
envisaged (Annex I (5) to Decision 1/95).
 52 See Annex I (6) to Decision 2/97 (OJ 1997 L 191/1).
Agreement and the EC–Turkey customs union. Within the EC–Swiss SAs, the 
information exchange procedure of the newly adopted acquis communautaire 
must be formally notified to Switzerland and vice versa within eight days. 
However, the EC–Swiss Joint Committees have full discretion on deciding 
whether to implement the new EC acquis into the Swiss legal system.53
In the EAs and SAAs, the procedure of information exchange constitutes 
an intrinsic part of the technical assistance package on behalf of the EU. This 
technical assistance package is aimed at assisting CEECs and SAA countries 
in their approximation efforts, and drafting their national legislation in 
accordance with EU standards,54 to meet the aims of eventual EU membership. 
Neither EAs nor SAAs envisage formal/informal involvement in EU decision-
making procedures. Instead, the procedure of information exchange in the 
EAs and SAAs presumes the EU’s informational assistance to the CEECs 
and SAA countries on the correct application and enforcement of the acquis 
communautaire and EC policies. Besides, the procedure of information 
exchange also covers the public education dimension. For instance, the 
EAs and the SAAs are supplemented by the so-called ‘information and 
communication’ procedure which is aimed at providing the general public 
with basic information on the EU and on the EC policies and institutions 
through educational events, training and conferences.55
EU external agreements which do not envisage the eventual integration of 
a third party into the EU do not provide a procedure of information exchange, 
but offer informational assistance within specific sectors of cooperation 
between the parties. For instance, the EC–South Africa TDCA envisages 
the mutual exchange of information procedures on customs, investment 
opportunities, postal cooperation and policy, consumer policy, cooperation 
on the recognition of degrees and diplomas, and health. The PCAs refer to 
informational assistance on behalf of the EU on investment opportunities, 
mining, transfer of technologies, regional policies, employment, media and 
customs. Besides, Parties to the PCAs promote the exchange of information 
on standards, inspection and certification in the field of telecommunications 
and information technology.56
We conclude that the procedure of information exchange is applied in 
line with the objectives of the EU external agreements. The above analysis 
shows that the EU external agreements which aim at the establishment of a 
customs union, close sectoral cooperation and access to markets between the 
EC and a third country (EEA Agreement, EC–Swiss SAs, Ankara Agreement) 
all envisage a binding procedure of information exchange, which is in turn 
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underpinned by the informal involvement of third country experts in the EC 
decision-making process. On the other hand, EC association, development, and 
partnership agreements (PCAs, EAs, SAAs, PCAs and others) refer to a non-
binding ‘information assistance’ procedure which does not commit but gives 
an opportunity for a party to the agreement to be informed and consulted on 
new EC legislation. In practice, information assistance within EC association, 
sectoral cooperation, development and partnership agreements have become 
a one-sided process with a strong educational dimension, where a third 
country acts as a mere recipient of what the EU institutions select to offer. 
The information assistance procedure aims to support the so-called ‘voluntary 
harmonization’ by supplying information on the acquis communautaire 
without any binding commitments on behalf of the EU. In our opinion, these 
dimensions clearly illustrate that the EU carefully tailors the format and 
objectives of the procedure of information exchange to specific objectives of 
its EU external agreements.
3. Technical, Administrative and Financial Assistance on Behalf of the EU to 
Third Countries
The export of the acquis communautaire into the legal orders of third 
countries is supported by technical and financial assistance packages on 
behalf of the EU. The EU provides technical and financial aid through more 
than 30 different legal instruments. Some of them are thematic, such as the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Most of them 
are geographical, such as the European Development Funds (which are, for 
instance, applied to the ACP countries), or purposefully tailored technical and 
financial assistance programmes (MEDA, PHARE, Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS), and Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)). In the last 
case, the objectives and scope of the EU technical and financial assistance 
packages may have common elements, but they differ in substantive issues, 
in line with the objectives of either EU external agreements or the status 
of political and economic relations between the EU and the third country. 
Technical assistance is provided under the auspices of EU-funded assistance 
programmes, encompassing a variety of activities, ranging from investment 
in infrastructure to assistance in legal drafting and education.57 In general, 
 57 In general, EU technical assistance covers the following activities: the exchange 
of experts, the exchange of experience and know-how, the provision of early information 
especially on relevant legislation, the organization of seminars, training activities, aid for the 
translation of EU legislation in the relevant sectors, assistance in drafting national legislation in 
accordance with the acquis communautaire, and the modernization and restructuring of specific 
sectors (agriculture, agro-industrial) in consistency with the EU rules and standards.
EXPORTING THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 51
EU technical and financial assistance targets the creation of good governance 
in third countries. However, there is a serious criticism of shortcomings on 
transparency and bureaucratization within the technical assistance itself, in 
particular in the tendering procedures. Some projects are ineffective, since 
they have not been adapted to local needs and specifics, and consultants are 
not sufficiently qualified. As some commentators correctly note, this situation 
hampers the promotion of EU values to the wider world.58
IV Conclusion
This article focused on selected substantive and procedural means of 
exporting the acquis into the legal systems of third countries. We argued 
that the former referred to the fundamental ways of implementing the acquis 
communautaire into third country legal orders. The latter related to specific 
technical/procedural tools which either directly or indirectly encourage the 
implementation of the acquis into third country legal orders. We believe that 
the substantive and procedural means of exporting the acquis are not uniformly 
applicable, but are rather exercised in accordance with the specific objectives 
of EU external agreements. Indeed, our analysis of EU external agreements 
confirms that their objectives unquestionably constitute a driving force behind 
understanding the role and mechanism of the substantive and procedural 
means of exporting the acquis. Among all these, homogeneity remains the 
most advanced tool for exporting the acquis since it achieves these objectives 
not only through the alignment of the EFTA member states’ national laws with 
the dynamic acquis but also through judicial dialogue between the ECJ and 
the EFTA Court. Nevertheless, the most recent EU external agreements do 
not replicate the entire homogeneity procedure found in earlier agreements. 
Instead, they apply selected elements of the homogeneity procedure in order 
to achieve the specific objectives of the EU external agreements. On the one 
hand, objectives to bring about closer economic and political cooperation 
(customs union, free trade area, mutual recognition regime) imply that third 
countries will accept binding substantive and procedural means to implement 
the acquis communautaire into their own legal system. On the other hand, 
the objectives of EC partnership, cooperation and development agreements 
envisage less ambitious substantive and procedural means (non-binding 
harmonization/approximation of laws commitments, supported by technical 
and educational assistance on behalf of the EU; they also do not envisage 
the involvement of a third country in EC decision-making procedures). In 
the former case, the EU expects candidate countries to import the fixed and 
 58 K.N. Metcalf, ‘Influence through Assistance: The EU Assistance Programmes’ (2003) 
9/3 EPL, pp. 425–442.
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dynamic acquis communautaire as widely and as soon as possible, whereas 
the latter EU external agreements encourage third countries to embark upon 
a process of voluntary harmonization through the gradual adoption of the 
relevant acquis.59
In conclusion to this article, it is also important to emphasize several 
important observations. The first relates to the acquis communautaire. EU 
external agreements target how the fixed and dynamic acquis are exported 
into the legal systems of third countries. The former is static and does not 
alter from the moment of signing. The latter constantly develops, to reflect the 
never-ending evolution of the acquis communautaire. Almost all EU external 
agreements prioritize the substantive and procedural means, which ensure the 
adoption of the dynamic acquis (homogeneity, binding/soft harmonization, 
approximation clauses and mutual recognition). This shows that the EU is 
eager to ensure that third countries keep track of, and quickly implement, the 
latest developments in the EU legal order.
Another observation is that the substantive and procedural means of 
exporting the acquis communautaire are supported by strong conditionality 
requirements. The further enhancement of bilateral relations between the EU 
and a third country, in particular the opening of negotiations on a mutual 
recognition regime, depends on the success of approximation efforts. Therefore, 
EU external agreements contain conditionality provisions such as ‘account 
shall be taken of the progress achieved by the Parties in the approximation of 
their laws’,60 or ‘the Community shall examine periodically whether [a party 
to an agreement] has indeed introduced such legislation [in the public utilities 
sector]’.61
These observations highlight our initial suggestion that the EU considers 
the export of the acquis communautaire an intrinsic part of its foreign policy 
towards third countries. Indeed, the substantive and procedural means of 
exporting the acquis into EU external agreements inspire third countries to 
adopt as much as possible of the dynamic acquis in order to create a comparable 
and friendly legal environment beyond existing and potential EU boundaries.
 59 A. Evans, The Integration of the European Community and Third States in Europe: a 
Legal Analysis (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1996), pp. 381–383. In general, A. Evans is critical 
regarding the nature of voluntary harmonization within the EAs. In his opinion, voluntary 
harmonization is ill-adapted to structural economic problems faced by these countries.
 60 Article 56(3) Croatia SAA.
 61 Article 72 Croatia and FYROM SAAs.
